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Did Bad Debtors Influence the Tenth Circuit to 
Make an Unfortunate Decision? Making 
Reorganization More Difficult for Farmers in 
United States v. Dawes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act1 of2005 ("BAPCPA")/ Congress added 11 U.S.C. § 
1222(a)(2)(A) to the Bankruptcy Code. At first blush, this provision 
appears to grant favorable treatment to Chapter 12 debtor-farmers, 
allowing them to "avoid some, if not all, of the tax generated from 
the sale of [their] assets. " 3 In United States v. Dawes,4 the Tenth 
Circuit addressed the implications of this code section tor tax 
liabilities that arise during the pendency of a Chapter 12 
bankruptcy. 5 
Relying primarily on what it considered to be the plain language 
and overall structure of the Bankruptcy Code, the Tenth Circuit 
greatly limited the application of§ 1222( a )(2 )(At by holding that it 
did not apply to tax liabilities arising after the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. 7 As a result, the application of that section was 
restricted to debtor-farmers who liquidate property before filing.s 
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit's holding in Dawes was 
wrong because the court should have interpreted§ 1222(a)(2)(A) to 
apply to postpetition filings. Part II reviews the relevant legal 
background, while Part III reviews the facts and procedural history 
1. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005 ). 
2. Pronounced "bap-see-puh." Glenn Stearns, Chapter 13 Repayment Plans: 
DePelopment and Drafting Considerations, 21 J. DUPAl;E COUC.:TY B. Ass'N 22, 22 (2008-
2009). 
3. Wesley f. Smith, "Rem;_qanizinlf" to Liquidate: Chapter 12 Anomaly, AM. BA='IKR. 
lNST. J., Oct. 2011, at 46. 
4. United States v. Dawes, 652 F.3d 1236 (1Oth Cir. 2011 ). 
5. Id. at 1237-38. 
6. Statutory references in the main text refer to Title 11 of the United States Code, 
unless stated otherwise. 
7. DaJl'es, 652 F.3d at 1244. 
8. In re Dawes, 382 B.R. 509, 519 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), afJ'd, 415 B.R. 815 
(D. Kan. 2009), reP'd, 652 F.3d 1236. 
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of Dawes. Part IV summarizes the Tenth Circuit's decision, and 
Part V argues that the Dawes decision was flawed because ( 1) the 
court adopted a definition of "incurred" that was at odds with its use 
in the applicable statute; (2) the court failed to address the 
appropriate question at issue; and ( 3) the court refused to recognize 
relevant legislative history. Part VI briefly concludes. 
II. RELEVANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Tax Treatment in Bankruptcy 
In 1980, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 
which helped clarifY how income taxes were to be treated in 
bankruptcy. The Act provided for the "creation of a new tax entity" 
in Chapter 7 and 11 cases filed by individuals.9 This creation of a 
separate tax entity or taxable estate allowed debtors' tax attributes to 
"pass into the bankruptcy estate." 10 This resulted in the bankruptcy 
estate itself (rather than the debtors) becoming legally responsible 
for paying most of the taxes triggered in bankruptcy, including 
ordinary income taxes and capital-gains taxes. 11 
In 1986, Congress enacted Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code 
as a response to the farm-debt crisis. 12 Chapter 12 was tailored to 
meet the needs of financially distressed family farmers by assisting 
them in repaying "all or part of their debts," 13 with the ultimate goal 
of "allowing them to continue operating their business at the 
conclusion of the bankruptcy." 14 However, Congress did not extend 
the concept of a separate bankruptcy estate to Chapter 12 filers/ 5 
which caused serious problems f(x farmers. 16 
9. Neil E. Harl, Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Treatment, 200X EMFRlilNG ISSUES 2964, 
Nov. 2008, at I. 
10. Id. 
I l. !d. 
12. Neil Harl, Continue Businns to Protect Gaim Trtq_qered in Chapter 12 Bankruptcy 
.from Tax, 20 I 0 EMERGING ISSUES 5103, June 2010, at I. 
13. U.S. COURTS, Family Farmer or FamilY Fisherman Bankruptcy, 
http://www. uscourts.gov /FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/Bankruptcy Basics/Chapter 12 .aspx 
(select the "Background" tab) (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
14. Douglas A. Bass, Annotation, Comideration and Consequences of Whether Chapter 12 
Bankruptcy Estate Can "Incur" Tax, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 289, 295 (201 I). 
15. Harl, supra note 12, at 2. 
16. Harl, mpra note 9, at l. 
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In many cases, farmers attempted to fund their bankruptcy 
plans, 17 in part, by selling farm property. 18 The capital-gains taxes 
resulting fi·om "these sales established the [IRS J as a new creditor." 19 
The IRS then argued that the resulting tax was an "administrative 
expense" incurred by the bankruptcy estate "in furtherance of 
preserving the estate" pursuant to§ 507(a)(2).20 As such, under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the resulting capital gains were a priority claim 
that had to "be paid in full" during the course of the debtor's plan. 21 
The IRS frequently "used this characterization to object to or 
outright veto otherwise acceptable bankruptcy plans. " 22 As a result, 
debtor-farmers often were placed in a position of being unable to 
f()fmulate a viable plan.23 
Congress attempted to address this problem in BAPCPA. 24 
However, instead of extending the concept of a separate tax estate 
(in which the bankruptcy estate is liable for taxes triggered in 
bankruptcy rather than the debtor personally) to Chapter 12 filers, 
Congress added ll U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) to the Bankruptcy 
Code.25 Section 1222 gives the necessary requirements for a Chapter 
12 plan to be confirmed. 26 Before the passage of BAPCP A, § 1222 
stated that "[ t ]he plan shall ... provide for the full payment, in 
deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under 
section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a particular claim agrees 
17. U.S. COURTS, supra note 13 ("Unless the court grants an extension, the debtor 
must tile a plan of repayment with the petition or within 90 days after tiling the petition. The 
plan, which must be submitted to the court t(>r approval, provides for payments ... to the 
trustee .... The trustee then distributes the funds to creditors according to the terms of the 
plan ... "). 
18. Bass, supra note 14, at 297. 
19. ld. 
20. ld. 
21. ld. at 296. 
22. !d. at 298. 
23. !d.; see alm 145 CONG. REC. 5750-02 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Grasslcy) ("Under current law [bct(Jre BAPCI'Aj, farmers often tace a crushing tax liability if 
they need to sell livestock or land in order to reorganize their business affairs."); Harl, supra 
note 12, at 2. 
24. Harl,supranotc 12,at 1. 
25. ld. at 2. 
26. In re Dawes, 382 B.R. 509, 512 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), afj'd, 415 B.R. 815 
(D. Kan. 2009), rep'd, 652 f.3d 1236 (lOth Cir. 20ll). 
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to a different treatment of such claim. " 27 With the addition of 
§ 1222(a)(2)(A), § 1222(a) now states that a plan must 
(2) provide for the fltll payment, in deferred cash payments, of all 
claims entitled to priority under section 507, unless-
(A) the claim is a claim owed to a governmental unit that arises as a 
result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any farm 
asset used in the debtor's farming operation, in which case the 
claim shall be treated as an unsecured claim that is not entitled to 
priority under section 507, but the debt shall be treated in such 
manner only if the debtor receives a discharge. 2 ~ 
Section 507, in turn, specifies ten categories of expenses and 
claims that are entitled to priority treatment in bankruptcy.29 Two of 
these categories apply specifically to taxes. 30 The first is in 
§ 507(a)(2) and includes "administrative expenses allowed under 
section 503(b )."31 Section 503(b )( 1) allows for "administrative 
expenses ... including ... any tax ... incurred by the estate." 32 The 
second category is in § 507(a)(8) and allows f()r "claims of 
governmental units ... for a tax on ... income or gross receipts for 
a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of the 
[bankruptcy] petition." 33 
With the addition of§ 1222(a)(2)(A), certain tax claims arising 
out of the sale of farm assets lose their priority status. 34 By allowing 
such claims to be treated under a plan as unsecured rather than as 
priority claims, these claims could be paid at less than l 00%, with the 
balance being discharged. 35 This was a significant benefit for debtor-
farmers in Chapter 12 because they were no longer required to pay 
their full tax liabilities. 36 At the same time, § 1222(a)(2)(A) was 
unfavorable to the IRS because it would no longer be able to collect 
the discharged taxes. 37 
27. II U.S.C. § 1222(a) (2000). 
28. Id. § 1222(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
29. Id. § 507. 
30. Knudsen v. I.R.S., 581 f.3d 696, 706 (8th Cir. 2009). 
31. II U.S.C. § 507(a)(2). 
32. Id. § 503(b)(l)(B)(i). 
33. Id. § 507(a)(8). 
34. Harl, mpra note 9, at 2. 
35. Id. 
36. Brendon Hansen, Note, All that Glitters l.ot 't Gold: Deciphcrin"q In re Knudsen's Tax 
Allocation Methods Under 11 U.S. C. § J222(tl}(2)(A) fin· Chapter 12 Debtors, 44 U.C:. DAVIS 
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B. Development of a Circuit Split 
While § 1222(a)(2)(A) was undoubtedly implemented to assist 
debtor-farmers in their reorganization under Chapter 12, the 
language of the section 3x fails to indicate whether the provision 
applies only to taxes arising from the transfer of farm assets 
prepetition, or to both prepetition and postpetition transfers. 39 In 
the ensuing litigation, it is not surprising that debtor-farmers have 
adopted the position that the exception applies to both pre- and 
postpetition transfers while the IRS has argued that it applies only to 
prepetition transfers. 40 
1. Allowing the application of§ 1222(a)(2)(A) to postpetition sales 
Until recently, most courts considering the application of § 
l222(a)(2)(A) have agreed with the debtor-farmers' position that 
both pre- and postpetition taxes are subject to reclassification as 
"unsecured claims that may be discharged following the successful 
administration of the bankruptcy estate."41 These courts have 
adopted the rationale that even though a separate taxable estate is 
not created in Chapter 12, a "nontaxable entity [the bankruptcy 
estate] can incur taxes as administrative expenses in a bankruptcy 
context. "42 Thus, tax claims arising from farm assets sold postpetition 
can attach to the bankruptcy estate and be subject to discharge under 
§ 1222(a)(2)(A).43 Further, these courts have indicated that this 
L. REv. 651,654 (20!0). 
37. Bass, supra note 14, at 299. 
38. Despite "congressional testimony to the effect that the act was so perfect that not a 
word need be changed," BAPCPA has been heavily criticized for its complexity, the poor 
quality of its draftsmanship, confusing language, and contradictions. Andrew J. Neumann, 
Note, "Money for Nothinlf and Your [Expenses/ for Free"-Federal Circuit Split on Vehiele 
Ownership Expense In BAPCPA Means Testinlf, 75 Mo. L. REv. 595, 596 (2010) (citing Jean 
Braucher, Rash tmd Ride-Tbroulfh Redux: The Terms for Holdinlf on to Cars, Homes, and Other 
Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 457 n.3 (2005)) 
(quotations omitted). The poor draftsmanship may be due in part "to the role that lawyers and 
lobbyists employed by various banks and credit card companies played in drafting it." Id. at 
595-96. 
39. Harl, supra note 9, at 2. 
40. Bass, supra note 14, at 298-99. 
41. Id. at 301; see Knudsen v. I.R.S. 581 F.3d 696, 710 (8th Cir. 2009). But see United 
States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.lfranted, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011). 
42. Bass, supra note 14, at 300. 
43. Id. at 303; Knudsen, 581 f.3d at 709-10. 
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reading of BAPCPA is more in line with congressional intent to assist 
debtor-farmers in reorganizing.44 
In Knudsen v. I.R.S.,45 the Eighth Circuit (the first federal circuit 
to address this issue) adopted the rationale prevailing in the 
bankruptcy courts that § 1222(a)(2)(A) was applicable to 
postpetition sales.46 The court relied on its previous recognition that 
"incurred by the estate" is interpreted as meaning "incurred 
postpetition. "47 As such, taxes resulting from a postpetition sale of 
farm property are administrative expenses pursuant to §§ 507(a)(2) 
and 503(b) and thus subject to § 1222(a)(2)(A).48 The court also 
noted that the plain language of§ 1222(a)(2)(A) did not restrict its 
application to only prepetition sales.49 Additionally, the court 
pointed out that while the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") does not 
create a separate taxable estate in Chapter 12, a bankruptcy estate is 
still created in a Chapter 12 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1207(a). 
That statute incorporates "all legal or equitable interest of the debtor 
in property as of the commencement of the case, "50 as well as all 
property acquired "after the commencement of the case but before 
the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under 
chapter 7."51 Because the sale of debtors' farm property falls within 
the scope of § 1207(a), postpetition taxes are an administrative 
expense subject to the application of§ l222(a)(2)(A). 52 
2. Prohibiting the application of§ 1222 (a) (2) (A) to postpetition sales 
Since the passage of BAPCPA, the IRS has completely changed 
its position. Instead of arguing that taxes arising from postpetition 
sales are priority claims under § 507,53 the IRS now argues that, 
pursuant to I.R.C. § 1399, it does not recognize a separate taxable 
44. 5ee Smith, ,-upm note 3, at 46. 
45. Knudmt, 581 F.3d at 710. 
46. Id. at 706. 
47. !d. at 708-09 (citing Mo. Dep't of Revenue v. L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 
1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
48. Id. 
49. !d. at709. 
50. ll U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (2006). 
51. !d.§ 1207(a)(l). 
52. Knudmt, 581 F.3d at 709-10. 
53. Bass, JUpra note 14, at 297. 
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estate in Chapter 12 cases.54 Consequently, a Chapter 12 estate is 
not a taxable entity that can incur taxes. 55 Therefore, postpetition 
taxes are incurred by the debtor personally and do not qualifY as a 
priority claim subject to§ 1222(a)(2)(A).56 
In United States v. Hall, the Ninth Circuit adopted the position 
and rationale of the IRS, thereby creating a circuit split. 57 
Additionally, the court reasoned that because the statutory language 
was clear, it was unnecessary to refer to legislative history. 58 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1988, Donald W. Dawes and Phyllis C. Dawes (the 
"Debtors") were convicted of "willfully failing to file income tax 
returns for the tax years 1981, 1982, and 1983."59 Both served seven 
months in federal prison.60 In addition, the Debtors later failed to 
pay income taxes for the years 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990.61 
As a result, tax liability was originally assessed at $142,007, but 
by 2006 this amount had increased to $1,747,841.53.62 In an 
attempt to avoid tax judgments, the Debtors began transferring their 
property into trusts managed by their family members. 63 They also 
transferred eight parcels of real property to the Plainsman Property 
Company.64 
In 2003, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") brought an 
action in the District of Kansas to reduce the Debtors' assessed tax 
liability to judgment and to set aside property transfers to the 
Plainsman Property Company as fraudulent. 65 The District Court 
entered a judgment fixing tax liability and setting aside the transfers 
as null and void. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
54. Knudsen, 581 f.3d at 709-10. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.lJranted, 131 
S. Ct 2989 (2011). 
58. Id. at 1166-67. 




63. Id. at 818. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 817-18. 
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ruling on appeal. 66 The IRS then sought to execute the judgment 
and notified the Debtors of its intent to take possession of the 
parcels.67 
On July 14, 2006, before the IRS could execute on its 
judgment, the Debtors filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 
7,68 which was subsequently converted to a Chapter 12 case. 69 On 
October 23, 2006, the IRS received relief from the automatic stay70 
to continue executing its judgment against the eight parcels.71 On 
November 13, 2006, the debtors filed their Chapter 12 plan of 
reorganization, which proposed to surrender the eight parcels in 
satisfaction of the IRS's claim.72 The plan also proposed that any 
postpetition (postfiling) taxes arising from the "sale, transfer, 
exchange, or other disposition" of the eight parcels would be treated 
as a general unsecured claim pursuant to II U.S.C. § 
1222(a)(2)(A).73 The IRS objected to the Debtors' plan on several 
grounds, including the downgrade of its claim from priority to 
unsecured. 74 However, the objection was not immediately addressed, 
and the eight parcels were sold for more than $900,000.75 The 
Debtors and the IRS agreed that the sale would result in the Debtors 
owing a large capital gains tax?6 
On August 9, 2007, the Debtors moved for a grant of partial 
summary judgment on the IRS's objection to their plan of 
reorganization. 77 The Debtors asked the court to enter a judgment 
indicating that § l222(a)(2)(A) allowed them to treat the 
postpetition (post-filing) capital gains tax resulting from the sale of 
66. Id.at818. 
67. Id. 
68. In re Dawes, 382 B.R. 509, 511 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), aj]"d, 415 B.R. 815 
(D. Kan. 2009), rn>'d, 652 F.3d 1236. 
69. Id. at 512. Section !222(a)(2)(A) (the statute at issue in In re Dawes) is not 
applicable in Chapter 7 cases. 
70. Upon the tiling of a bankruptcy proceeding, an automatic stay is put in place to bar 
creditors from enforcing judgments against the debtor or property of the estate. See II U.S. C. 
§ 362 (2006). 






77. In rc Dawes, 382 B.R. 509, 512 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), ajj"d, 415 B.R. 815 
(D. Kan. 2009), rev'd, 652 F. 3d 1236. 
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the eight parcels as an unsecured claim in their Chapter 12 plan. 78 
The IRS filed a reply and cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment. 7'~ The bankruptcy court granted the Debtors' motion for 
partial summary judgment.80 The IRS appealed that order to the 
District Court of Kansas where the bankruptcy court's judgment was 
affirmed. 81 The IRS then appealed to the Tenth Circuit.82 
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION 
In United States v. Dawes, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the 
plain language and overall structure of the Bankruptcy Code indicate 
that taxes resulting from the postpetition sale of farm property 
cannot be downgraded to an unsecured claim pursuant to § 
1222(a)(2)(A).83 Thus, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in 
the circuit split. 
The court began its analysis with what it considered to be the 
"plain language of§ 503(b)." More specifically, the court focused 
on the phrase "incurred by the estate. " 84 Referring to several 
dictionaries, which defined the term "incur" to mean "to 'suffer or 
bring on oneself~' as in a 'liability or expense,' ... 'to become 
through one's own action liable or subject to,"'85 the court 
concluded that "one who has 'incurred' an expense is liable for it. " 86 
The court then looked to the relevant tax authority in the IRC to 
determine who was liable for the tax resulting from the sale of the 
Debtors' farm parcels,87 concluding that whoever was "liable" for the 
tax is the party who "incurred" it. 88 
The court then concluded that the Debtors were personally liable 
for the taxes because, according to the IRC, Chapter 12 debtors 





82. United States\'. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236, 1236 (lOth Cir. 2011). 
83. Id. at 1244. 
84. Id. at 1239. 
85. ld. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 782 (8th ed. 2004); 7 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 834-35 (2d ed. 1989) ). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1240. 
88. Id. 
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the IRC, in Chapter 7 and 11, a separate tax estate is created. 89 The 
trustee of the bankruptcy estate is required to file separate returns for 
the bankruptcy estate and pay any resulting taxes from the estate 
assets.90 The bankruptcy estate is personally liable for paying any 
taxes incurred by the estate. 91 On the other hand, in Chapter 12 and 
13, a separate tax estate is not created and "the debtor-not the 
bankruptcy estate-bears the sole responsibility for filing and paying 
postpetition . . . taxes. "92 The court therefore concluded that 
because it is the debtor in a Chapter 12 that is "liable" for paying the 
taxes, it was the Debtors-and not the estate-who incurred the 
postpetition taxes in this case.93 Although the bankruptcy estate may 
have possessed the farm assets at one point and caused the tax 
liability, this did not mean that the taxes were incurred by the 
bankruptcy estate. Rather, they were incurred by the Debtors.94 The 
court analogized that a bankruptcy estate, like a corporate officer, 
"may have caused the tax to arise, but it is the [debtor or the] 
corporation that incurred and is liable tor it. "95 
The court rejected the Debtors' interpretation of "incurred by 
the estate" as meaning "tax incurred during bankruptcy,"96 
indicating that there is no way to read this interpretation into the 
text of the statute.97 Because the court adopted the premise that 
"one who has 'incurred' an expense is liable for it,"98 the language 
"incurred by the estate" clearly focuses on who did the incurring 
rather than "when a liability was incurred."99 
The court further indicated that its decision was supported by 
the "larger structure of the bankruptcy code. " 100 If Congress had 
wanted § 503(b) to apply to taxes incurred postpetition, "it surely 
knew how to do so." 101 For example, the language 111 
89. See id. 
90. I d. 
91. !d. 




96. I d. 
97. !d. 
98. !d. 
99. Jd. at 1241. 
100. I d. 
101. !d. 
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§ 503(b )( 1 )(A)(i ), "wages salaries, and commissions for services 
rendered after the commencement of the case," clearly refers to 
postpetition services. 102 
Additionally, the court argued that a reading of § 503(b) 
requiring the inclusion of postpetition taxes in Chapter 12 would 
require inclusion of postpetition taxes in Chapter 13,103 in which case 
postpetition tax liability would have to be included in a debtor's 
Chapter 13 plan. 104 However, 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) gives the 
government the option to include or not include a postpetition tax 
claim in a Chapter 13 plan. 105 Moreover, the Debtors' reading of 
§ 503(b) would require the bankruptcy estate to pay for "state 
income taxes incurred during the bankruptcy." 106 This would be at 
odds with § 346(b ), which prohibits the bankruptcy estate from 
paying state and local taxes. 107 
Therefore, relying on what it determined to be the "plain 
language and larger statutory structure" of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
court held that the Debtors personally, and not the bankruptcy 
estate, incurred the tax liability resulting from the sale of the 
parcels. 10x Therefore, the liability could not be treated as an 
unsecured claim in their Chapter 12 plan of reorganization pursuant 
to§ 1222(a)(2)(A). 109 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Dawes was Hawed for a number 
of reasons. First, the court adopted an incorrect definition for the 
term "incurred" in the phrase "incurred by the estate" because that 
ddinition was at odds with its use in § 503. Second, the court 
ignored the relevant question at issue, which was whether Congress 
was referring to a taxable estate or to the bankruptcy estate in the 
phrase "incurred by the estate." And third, because the issue above 
102. I d. 
103. I d. 
104. I d. 
105. !d. 
106. Id. at 1242. 
107. I d. 
108. Id. at 1244. 
109. I d. 
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has no clear answer, the court should have consulted relevant 
legislative history, which it improperly ignored. 
A. Incorrect Interpretation 
The Tenth Circuit based its decision on an incorrect 
interpretation of the phrase "incurred by the estate" in § 503(b ). 
The court looked to dictionary definitions of the word "incurred" to 
conclude that there was no "room for debate on [the] proposition 
[that] one who has 'incurred' an expense is liable for it." 110 While 
some definitions of the word "incurred" may suggest that a party 
who has incurred an expense is liable for it, the court's adoption of 
this definition is incorrect when taken in the context of§ 503. 
Section 503 sets forth the different types of expenses or claims 
that are considered administrative expenses, meaning those claims 
that are entitled to priority status and must be paid in full through a 
debtor's Chapter 12 plan.u 1 Among these types of claims are "the 
actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate 
including . . . taxes incurred by the estate," certain expenses 
"incurred by a creditor," and "costs and expenses of closing a health 
care business incurred by a trustee or by a Federal agency. "u 2 
Bankruptcy trustees are not personally liable for the costs that 
arise in the appropriate execution of their duties in administrating 
the bankruptcy estate. 113 Under the court's definition of "incurred," 
the section relating to health care businesses above would in essence 
have to read: "costs and expenses of closing a health care business for 
which the trustee is liable." Because trustees are generally not liable 
for costs incurred in preserving the estate, the costs of closing a 
health care business could not be included as an administrative 
expense. This would clearly be at odds with the purpose of§ 503 to 
ll 0. I d. at 1239. 
Ill. ll U.S.C. §§ 503, 507(a)(2), l222(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
112. ld. § 503(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
113. See Mosser\'. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267,274 (1951). The Bankruptcy Code docs not 
provide any guidance as to when a bankruptcy trustee may be held liable in his or her 
individual capacity, and courts have come to ditlering conclusions on this issue. See E. Allan 
Tiller, Personal Liability of Trustees and ReceiJ'ers in Bankruptcy, 53 A\1. BANKR. L.J. 75 
( 1979). However, in cases where the trustee has been held personally liable, it has been due to 
a breach of his or her fiduciarv duties. See Ccff., In re San Juan Hotel Corp., 847 F.2d 931, 937 
(1st Cir. 1988) (trustee has personal liability for willfi.II and deliberate violations of the trustee's 
duties); In re Gorski, 766 F.2d 723, 727 (2d Cir. 1985) (trustee has personal liability lor 
negligence). 
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treat costs of preserving the estate as administrative expenses, and 
would render§ 503(b)(8) meaningless. Thus, when Congress used 
the phrases "incurred by" in § 503, it likely was not referring to the 
party liable for the tax or expense, but rather intended to refer to the 
party responsible for creating it. This conclusion is also consistent 
with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' reading of "incurred" in§ 503. 
The court therefore hastily adopted the view that by determining 
who was "liable" for the tax, it could determine who "incurred" the 
tax for purposes of § 503(b ). If the court had adopted an 
interpretation of the word "incurred" in § 503 that was consistent 
with the language and scope of the statute, the more appropriate 
question in this case would have been whether party responsible for 
creating the tax liability was the debtor or the bankruptcy estate. 
This is the question that was addressed by the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuit. The Eighth Circuit's answer to this question was the 
bankruptcy estate, while the Ninth (rejecting legislative history) 
responded that it was the debtor personally. 114 
B. What Did Congress Intend? 
Even though the Tenth Circuit in Dawes did not specifically 
address the question of who was responsible for creating the tax 
liability, it did point out that the bankruptcy estate "may have once 
possessed the farm assets in question .... And the [bankruptcy] 
estate might well have caused a tax liability to arise. " 115 From this 
language, it appears that the court could easily have determined that 
it was the bankruptcy estate that was responsible for creating the tax 
liability. In turn, the postpetition tax liability could have been 
downgraded and discharged. Yet, because of the court's incorrect 
reliance on "liability" being the key factor in determining who 
"incurred" the tax rather than who was responsible for creating the 
tax, the court concluded that it did not matter. 116 
Due to the ambiguity in the Bankruptcy Code, there are 
persuasive arguments that postpetition taxes are incurred by the 
bankruptcy estate, and that they are incurred by the debtor 
personally. It seems that the underlying question invoked by the 
114. See United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.granted, 
131 S. Ct 2989 (2011); Knudsen v. I.R.S., 581 F.3d 696,709-10 (8th Cir. 2009). 
115. Dawes, 652 F.3d at 1240. 
116. See id. 
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Eighth and Ninth Circuit opinions is whether the IRC or the 
Bankruptcy Code's recognition of "estate" should control. The IRC 
does not recognize a separate taxable entity in Chapter 12, so under 
this recognition, there is no estate that could incur taxes and, as such, 
it is the debtor who incurs the taxes. 117 At the same time, the 
Bankruptcy Code does recognize a separate bankruptcy estate in 
Chapter 12.1!8 This leaves courts and practitioners wondering what 
Congress meant when it used the term "incurred by the estate" in § 
503(b ). Was it referring to the bankruptcy estate or to the taxable 
estate (available only in Chapter 7 and 11 cases)? 
There is no definite way of knowing what Congress was 
thinking. In fact, the Tenth Circuit may have incorrectly interpreted 
the phrase "incurred by the estate" in order to get around having to 
decide what Congress had in mind. Yet, in situations like the one 
presented in Dawes, where the language of the statute is ambiguous, 
it would have been appropriate for the court to look at the relevant 
legislative history. 119 
The Senate Committee Report relating to § 503 states: "In 
general, administrative expenses include . . . taxes on capital gains 
from sales of property by the trustee and taxes on income earned by 
the estate during the case. " 120 While this language suggests that 
postpetition taxes could be an administrative expense, it does not 
give any guidance as to whether the term "estate" is referring to the 
taxable estate available only in Chapter 7 and 11, or to the 
bankruptcy estate applicable in all chapters, including 12. 
There is limited legislative history for§ 1222(a)(2)(A). In fact, 
there is no direct history for this section. However, a proposed 
amendment to § 1222( a)(2) of language identical to that ultimately 
implemented by BAPCPA in § 1222(a)(2)(A)121 "was originally 
introduced as part of the 'Safety 2000' legislation in 1999." 122 
Senator Grassley made the following remark when introducing the 
'Safety 2000' legislation: 
117. See26 U.S.C. § 1399 (2006). 
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1207(a) .. 
119. Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 716. 
120. S. REr. No. 95-989, at 66 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5854. 
121. In re Flicken, 430 B.R. 648, 653 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009). 
122. In re Knudsen, 389 B.R. 643, 660 (N.D. Iowa 2008). 
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Under current law, farmers often face a crushing tax liability if they 
need to sell livestock or land in order to reorganize their business 
affairs . . . . [ H ]igh taxes have caused farmers to lose their farms. 
Under the bankruptcy code, the I.R.S. must be paid in full for any 
tax liabilities generated during a bankruptcy reorganization. If the 
farmer can't pay the I.R.S. in full, then he can't keep his farm .... 
'Safety 2000' takes this power away from the I.R.S.by reducing the 
priority of taxes during proceedings. This will free up capital for 
investment in the farm, and help farmers stay in the business of 
farming. 123 
In Dawes, the Tenth Circuit refused to give any weight to this 
statement because it was made six years prior to the enactment of§ 
1222(a)(2)(A). 124 However, because the problem that existed for 
farmers trying to reorganize in 1999 still existed when this section 
was added in 2005 (tax liabilities were preventing farmers from 
effectively reorganizing under Chapter 12 ), it is unlikely that the 
reason for adding the identical language to§ 1222(a)(2) dramatically 
changed. Senator Grassley's statement clearly indicates that this 
section was intended to reduce tax liabilities generated during 
bankruptcy reorganization, meaning taxes arising in Chapter 12. 
Thus, it can be inferred that Congress intended for§ 1222(a)(2)(A) 
to apply to taxes arising postpetition in Chapter 12. Since this is the 
case, it can be presumed that in § 503, "estate" refers to the 
bankruptcy estate and not the separate taxable estate created only in 
Chapter 7 and 11. Thus, although it is not clear from the language 
of§ 503 whether "incurred by the estate" referred to a taxable estate 
or the bankruptcy estate, legislative history makes it clear that 
Congress intended to assist debtor-farmers in their Chapter 12 
reorganizations and that § 1222(a)(2)(A) was added to the 
Bankruptcy Code to provide relief from tax liabilities arising in 
bankruptcy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Dawes, the Tenth Circuit may have concluded that § 
1222(a)(2)(A) did not apply to postpetition tax liabilities in order to 
prevent two bad debtors from using the bankruptcy code to reduce 
123. 145 CONG. REc. S750-02 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (emphasis added) (statement of 
Sen. Grasslcy). 
124. United States v. Dawes (In re Dawes), 652 f.3d 1236, 1244 (lOth Cir. 2011 ). 
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their tax liabilities. Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Dawes was 
based on an incorrect interpretation of the phrase "incurred by the 
estate" and was inconsistent with Congress's intent. As a result of 
this decision, reorganization for many honest debtor-farmers will 
unfortunately remain difficult, and many may unnecessarily lose their 
farms. Only those farmers who are savvy enough to sell assets prior 
to the filing of their Chapter 12 will be able to take advantage of§ 
1222(a)(2)(A). Because the language of§ 503 is ambiguous, the 
court should have consulted relevant legislative history and found, 
consistent with Congress' intent, that § 1222(a)(2)(A) applies to 
taxes incurred postpetition. This finding would have resulted m 
helping debtor-farmers to keep their farms and remain in business. 
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